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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I consider a dynamic economy in which a government needs to ﬁnance a stochastic
process of purchases. The agents in the economy are privately informed about their skills, which
evolve stochastically over time in an arbitrary fashion. I construct an optimal tax system that is
restricted to be linear in an agent’s wealth but can be arbitrarily nonlinear in his current and past
labor incomes. I ﬁnd that wealth taxes in a given period depend on the individual’s labor income
in that period and previous ones. However, in any period, the expectation of an agent’s wealth
tax rate rate in the following period is zero. As well, the government never collects any net revenue
from wealth taxes.
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or the Federal Reserve System.In this paper, I consider the following question. Suppose a government needs to ﬁnance
a given stochastic process of purchases using wealth taxes and labor income taxes. What
are the properties of the optimal wealth taxes?
There is a great deal of literature that addresses these and related questions using a
Ramsey approach: the government is assumed to be able to use only linear taxes on wealth
and/or labor income. (See Chari and Kehoe (1999) for an excellent survey.) I instead use
what I term a Mirrlees approach. Like Mirrlees (1971), I assume that agents diﬀer in skills
(that is, labor productivities), and that a given agent is privately informed about his skill.
The government’s tax code is restricted only by the government’s informational limitations.
Both the Mirrlees and Ramsey approaches are motivated by the fact that modern societies
rarely use lump-sum taxes, but they diﬀer dramatically in the way that they deal with this
fact. Under the Ramsey approach, the government cannot use lump-sum taxes. Under the
Mirrlees approach, the government chooses not to use lump-sum taxes.
My analysis builds oﬀ a recent paper by Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003)
(henceforth, GKT). GKT consider a dynamic economy in which individual skills are private
information. Skills are allowed to follow arbitrary stochastic processes; however, preferences
are restricted to be additively separable between consumption and leisure. In this setting,
GKT provide a partial characterization of Pareto optimal allocations. They show that in
all periods, any individual’s shadow interest rate is no higher than, and typically strictly less
than, the rate of return to capital. In other words, it is Pareto optimal to have a wedge
between individual shadow interest rates and social shadow interest rates.
GKT’s results are about wedges in Pareto optima, not taxes in an economy with de-
centralized trade. In this paper, I provide a partial characterization of optimal taxes in aversion of GKT’s model economy. Unlike GKT, I allow for publicly observable aggregate
shocks (including government purchases shocks). As in GKT, agents’ preferences are addi-
tively separable over time and between consumption and leisure. I adopt the following model
of trade. I assume that agents can sell units of eﬀective labor and rent capital to a represen-
tative ﬁrm, subject to taxes that are allowed to be arbitrarily nonlinear functions of current
and past labor income, but are restricted to be linear in wealth.
I construct a class of such tax systems that weakly implement the optimal allocation.
The main result in my paper concerns the nature of the wealth taxes in these optimal systems.
It would seem natural in this setting to use a tax system in which the wealth tax rate levied
in period (t +1 )is equal to the socially optimal wedge between private and social shadow
interest rates between period t and period (t+1). We know from the work of GKT that under
such a system, the wealth tax would typically be positive on each person. However, following
Golosov and Tsyvinski (2003a) and Albanesi and Sleet (2003), I show that this kind of tax
system is suboptimal. The problem is that such a system does not have enough instruments
to prevent individuals from doing a joint deviation of saving and lying.
I instead design an optimal tax system that uses period (t +1 )wealth taxes that
depend on period (t+1)labor income (as well as prior labor incomes). I ﬁnd that under the
optimal system, an individual’s expected wealth tax rate in period (t+1), conditional on his
period t information and on the period (t +1 )history of public shocks, is zero. Individuals
who are surprisingly highly skilled in period (t+1)receive a subsidy that is a linear function
of their wealths. Individuals who are surprisingly unskilled in period (t +1 )are taxed on
their wealths. Intuitively, society needs income-contingent wealth taxes to deter the joint
deviation of an individual’s accumulating too much wealth from period t to period (t +1 )
2a n dt h e nn o tw o r k i n ge n o u g hi np e r i o d(t +1 ) . For this reason, it is optimal to have higher
wealth taxes on those who generate less labor income.
The above result has strong implications for aggregate wealth tax revenue. Consider
a group of agents in period t who have the same history of individual shocks through period
t. Because their histories are the same, all of these agents choose the same level of capital to
hold from period t to period (t+1). In period (t+1), their wealth tax rates diﬀer, depending
on their labor income realization in that period. But, as stated in the above paragraph, the
average optimal wealth tax rate across the agents in this group is zero. Since they all have the
same capital, it follows that the net wealth tax revenue in this group is zero. By adding up
across all such groups, we can conclude that aggregate net wealth tax collections are always
zero. The optimal wealth taxes are purely redistributional in every date and state.
This paper is not the ﬁrst to look at optimal taxes (as opposed to wedges) in a
dynamic version of Mirrlees’ model. Golosov and Tsyvinski (2003a) construct an optimal tax
system in the Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) disability insurance model. Albanesi and Sleet
(2003) design an optimal tax system for the case in which individual skills are independently
and identically distributed over time. In both of these papers, the optimal tax systems are
considerably simpler than the one that I design. Golosov and Tsyvinski construct a system
in which agents face a age-dependent asset test to receive welfare beneﬁts. In Albanesi and
Sleet’s system, the optimal taxes are a function only of current wealth and current labor
income (although this function is allowed to be arbitrarily nonlinear). But this simplicity
comes at a cost: both papers restrict attention to a narrow class of stochastic processes for
skills, and disregard the possibility of aggregate shocks.
Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (CCK) (1994) consider the same question as I do: what
3is the structure of optimal capital income taxes when government purchases are stochastic?
However, they use the Ramsey approach: they assume that there is no heterogeneity across
individuals and assume that the government can only use linear taxes on labor and capital
income. They ﬁnd that the period t conditional expectation of period (t+1)tax rates is near
zero, but the conditional variance is large. These results may seem to be the same as mine.
However, CCK’s expectations are over diﬀerent random variables. Their results imply
that the conditional variance of capital income tax rates over aggregate states is non-zero.
According to my analysis, the aggregate net wealth tax collections are zero. Any uncertainty
over optimal wealth tax rates is generated by individual-level risk, not aggregate risk.
This diﬀerence in results is hardly surprising, because entirely diﬀerent forces are at
work in the two kinds of analyses. In the Ramsey approach, the goal is to minimize the
deadweight loss associated with the distortions generated by the linearity of taxes. (Suﬃ-
ciently nonlinear taxes are non-distorting, because they are lump-sum.) Under the Mirrlees
approach, the goal is to design taxes so as to minimize the deadweight loss associated with
providing good incentives.
1. Environment
In this section, I describe the environment. The description is similar to that in GKT,
except that I allow for the possibility of publicly observable aggregate shocks.
The economy lasts for T periods, where T is ﬁnite, and has a unit measure of agents.
The economy is initially endowed with K∗
1 units of the single capital good. There is a
single consumption good that can be produced by capital and labor. The agents have
identical preferences. A given agent has von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, and ranks
4deterministic sequences according to the function:
T X
t=1
β
t−1{u(ct) − v(lt)},1 >β>0
where ct ∈ R+ is the agent’s consumption in period t, and lt ∈ R+ is the agent’s labor in
period t. I assume that u0,−u00,v 0, and v00 all exist are and are positive. I also assume that u
and v are bounded from above and below.
There are two kinds of shocks in the economy: public aggregate shocks and private
idiosyncratic shocks. The ﬁrst kind of shocks works as follows. Let Z be a ﬁnite set, and let
µZ be a probability measure over the subsets of ZT that assigns positive probability to all
elements of ZT. At the beginning of period 1, an element zT of ZT is drawn according to µZ.
The random vector zT is the sequence of public aggregate shocks; zt is the realization of the
shock in period t.
The idiosyncratic shocks work as follows. Let Θ be a Borel set in R+, and let µΘ be a
probability measure over the Borel subsets of ΘT. At the beginning of period 1, an element
of θ
T is drawn for each agent according to the measure µΘ. Conditional on zT, the draws are
independent across agents. I assume that a law of large numbers applies: conditional on any
zT, the measure of agents in the population with type θ
T in Borel set B is given by µΘ(B).
Any given agent learns the realization of zt and his own θt at the beginning of period
t and not before. Thus, at the beginning of period t, the agent knows his own private history
θ
t =( θ1,...,θt) and the history of public shocks zt =( z1,...,zt). This implies that his choices
in period t can only be a function of this history.
What is the economic impact of these shocks? First, the shocks determine skills. In
5period t, an agent produces eﬀective labor yt a c c o r d i n gt ot h ef u n c t i o n :
yt(θ
T,z
T)=φt(θ
T,z
T)lt(θ
T,z
T)
φt : Θ
T × Z
T → (0,∞)
φt is (θ
t,z
t)-measurable
I assume that an agent’s eﬀective labor is observable at time t, but his labor input lt is known
only to him. Ir e f e rt oφt as an agent’s skill in history (θ
t,zt). T h ei d e ah e r ei st h a te v e r y o n e
shows up for eight hours per day, and their output at the end of the day is observable.
However, it is hard to monitor how hard they are working and what kinds of shocks they face
during the day.
The public aggregate shocks inﬂuence the aggregate production function in the follow-
ing way. I deﬁne an allocation in this society to be (c,y,K) where:
K : Z
T → R
T+1
+
c : Θ
T × Z
T → R
T
+
y : Θ
T × Z
T → [0,y]
Kt+1 is z
t-measurable
(ct,y t) is (θ
t,z
t)-measurable
Here, yt(θ
T,zT)( ct(θ
T,zT)) is the amount of eﬀective labor (consumption) assigned in period
t to an agent with type θ
T, given that the public aggregate shock sequence is zT.K t+1 is the
amount of capital carried over period t into period (t +1 ) .
6As mentioned above, I assume that the initial endowment of capital is K∗
1. Ia s s u m e
that the government has exogenous purchasing needs Gt : ZT → R+ in period t,w h e r eGt is
zt-measurable. I deﬁne an allocation (c,y,K) to be feasible if for all t,zT:
Ct(z
T)+Kt+1(z
T)+Gt(z
T) ≤ Ft(Kt,Y t,z
T)+( 1− δ)Kt(z
T)
Ct(z
T)=
Z
θT∈ΘT ct(θ
T,z
T)dµΘ
Yt(z
T)=
Z
θT∈ΘT yt(θ
T,z
T)dµΘ
K1 ≤ K
∗
1
Here, Ft : R2
+×ZT → R+ is assumed to be strictly increasing, weakly concave, homogeneous
of degree one, continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to its ﬁrst two arguments, and zt-
measurable with respect to its last argument. Note that (Ct,Y t) are zt-measurable.
Both φt and Ft are allowed to depend on the history of shocks in potentially com-
plicated nonlinear ways. In particular, in keeping with recent empirical descriptions of
idiosyncratic shocks to wages (Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001)), the variance of φt,
conditional on θ
t and zt+1, may well be a nondegenerate function of zt+1.
Because θt is only privately observable, allocations must respect incentive-compatibility
conditions. (The following deﬁnitions correspond closely to those in GKT.) A reporting strat-
egy σ : ΘT ×ZT → ΘT ×ZT, where σt is (θ
t,zt)-measurable and σ(θ
T,zT)=( θ
T0,zT). Let Σ
be the set of all possible reporting strategies, and deﬁne:
W(.;c,y):Σ → R
W(σ;c,y)=
T X
t=1
β
t−1
Z
ZT
Z
ΘT{u(ct(σ)) − v(yt(σ)/φt)}dµΘdµZ
7to be the expected utility from reporting strategy σ, given an allocation (c,y). (Note that
the integral over Z c o u l da l s ob ew r i t t e na sas u m . ) L e tσTT be the truth-telling strategy
σTT(θ
T,zT)=( θ
T,zT) for all θ
T,zT. Then, an allocation (c,y,K) is incentive-compatible if:
W(σTT;c,y) ≥ W(σ;c,y) for all σ in Σ
An allocation which is incentive-compatible and feasible is said to be incentive-feasible.
An optimal allocation is an allocation (c,y,K) that solves the problem of maximizing:
T X
t=1
β
t−1
Z
ZT
Z
ΘT{u(ct) − v(yt/φt)}dµΘdµZ
subject to (c,y,K) being incentive-feasible. The idea here is that all agents are treated
symmetrically. There is an optimal allocation (the constraint set is compact in the product
topology and the objective continuous in the same topology)
2. An Intertemporal Characterization of Optimal Consumption Al-
locations
In this section, I provide a partial characterization of optimal allocations that is valid
for any speciﬁcation of the exogenous elements of the model (φ,F,µΘ,µ Z,u,v,β,Z,Θ).T h e
main contribution is that I extend GKT’s intertemporal characterization into this setting
with aggregate shocks.
The key proposition is the following. It establishes that any optimal allocation must
satisfy a particular ﬁrst order condition (similar to that derived in Theorem 1 of GKT (2003)
and in Rogerson (1985)).
Proposition 1. Suppose (c∗,y∗,K∗) is an optimal allocation and that there exists t<T
and scalars M+,M + such that M+ ≥ c∗
t,c ∗
t+1,K∗
t+1 ≥ M+ > 0 almost everywhere. Then there
8exists λ
∗
t+1 : ZT → R+ such that:
λ
∗
t+1 is z
t+1-measurable
λ
∗
t+1 = β[E{u
0(c
∗
t+1)
−1|θ
t,z
t+1}]
−1/u
0(c
∗
t) a.e.
E{λ
∗
t+1(1 − δ + F
∗
K,t+1)|z
t} =1a.e.
where F ∗
K,t+1(zT)=FK,t+1(K∗
t+1(zT),Y∗
t+1(zT),zT) for all zT.
Proof. In appendix.
The content of this proposition is twofold. First, it establishes that:
β{E(u
0(c
∗
t+1)
−1|θ
t,z
t+1)}
−1/u
0(c
∗
t)
is independent of θ
t. This result is obviously true without private information, because in that
case the optimal c∗
t is independent of θ
t. In the presence of private information, it is generally
optimal to allow c∗
t to depend on θ
t in order to require high-skilled agents to produce more
eﬀective labor. Proposition 1 establishes that even in that case, the harmonic mean of
βu0(c∗
t+1)/u0(c∗
t), conditional on θ
t and zt+1, is independent of θ
t.
Second, the theorem establishes that this harmonic conditional mean is equal to the
social discount factor (λ) between period t and period (t+1). The social discount factor can
then be used to determine the optimal level of capital accumulation between period t and
period (t +1 ) .
Why does the relationship involve harmonic means, as opposed to arithmetic means?
Assume Θ is ﬁnite, and think about the marginal beneﬁt to the planner of getting ε extra units
of per-capita consumption in history zt. At ﬁrst glance, one might think that the marginal
9beneﬁt is proportional to the arithmetic mean of marginal utilities:
ε
X
θt∈Θt
µΘ(θ
t)u
0(ct(θ
t,z
t))
(For the purposes of this intuitive argument, I write ct as a function of (θ
t,zt), not (θ
T,zT).
This is without loss of generality, because ct is (θ
t,zt)-measurable.) But this implicitly as-
sumes that each agent is receiving ε units of consumption regardless of history, which will
typically violate incentive constraints.
Instead, the extra resources should be split so that each agent θ
t receives η(θ
t), where
P
θt∈Θt η(θ
t)µΘ(θ
t)=ε and for all θ
t,θ
t0:
u(ct(θ
t,z
t)+η(θ
t)) − u(ct(θ
t0,z
t)+η(θ
t0)) = 0
or, using a ﬁrst order approximation:
u
0(ct(θ
t,z
t))η(θ
t)=u
0(ct(θ
t0,z
t))η(θ
t0)=B
for some B. We can solve for B using:
ε =
X
θt∈Θt
BµΘ(θ
t)/u
0(ct(θ
t,z
t))
so that the marginal gain to the planner is given by:
X
θt∈Θt
µΘ(θ
t)u
0(ct(θ
t,z
t))η(θ
t)
= B
= ε[
X
θt∈Θt
µΘ(θ
t)/u
0(ct(θ
t,z
t))]
−1
10The shadow value of resources in a history zt is given by the harmonic mean of marginal
utilities, not the arithmetic mean.1
Proposition 1 immediately implies that there is an intertemporal wedge of the sort
established by GKT. By using Jensen’s inequality, we get:
βE{u
0(c
∗
t+1)(1 − δ + FK,t+1)|z
t,θ
t} >u
0(c
∗
t)
with positive probability if Va r(u0(c∗
t+1)|zt+1,θ
t) > 0. Thus, we get a wedge between the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and the intertemporal marginal rate of transfor-
mation: an individual’s marginal expected utility from selling capital tomorrow exceeds his
marginal disutility from buying capital today.
3. Taxes and Wedges
At this stage, we have provided an intertemporal characterization of the Pareto optimal
quantities in this dynamic Mirrlees world. But what does this result say about taxes?
A. A Problem with the Natural Tax/Wedge Connection
It is natural to think of the intertemporal wedge as telling us that optimal capital
taxes should be positive. Why? If agents can buy and sell capital in a competitive market
subject to a linear tax, they face the following ﬁrst order condition:
βE{u
0(ct+1)(1 − δ + FK,t+1)(1 − τ
k
t+1)|θ
t,z
t} = u
0(ct).
1Note that the proposition reduces to Theorem 1 of GKT if Z i sas i n g l e t o n( s ot h e r ea r en oa g g r e g a t e
shocks). The proof of Proposition 1 also resembles the proof of Theorem 1 in GKT. Both proofs work by
ﬁrst establishing that the optimal allocation must satisfy a particular resource minimization problem. But
the nature of the minimization problem is diﬀerent. GKT’s proof constructs the constraint set in the resource
minimization problem by keeping the utility from consumption along all realizations of θ
T the same as in a
putative optimum. In my proof, I construct the constraint set by keeping the utility diﬀerential between any
two paths the same.
11If τk
t+1 is (θ
t,zt)-measurable, then it must be larger than 0 if the equilibrium allocation is to
be Pareto optimal.
B u ti tm a yb es u b o p t i m a lf o rτk
t+1 to be (θ
t,zt)-measurable.2 To see this, consider the
following example (which is similar to ones described in Albanesi and Sleet (2003) and Golosov
and Tsyvinski (2003)). Let u(c)=l n ( c), and v(l)=l2/2. Suppose T =2 ,Θ = {0,1},
Z = {1},π h =1 /2,and F(K,Y )=rK + wY. As well, suppose φ1(θ)=1 ,φ 2(θ,z)=θ, and
v(l)=l2/2. Set G =0 . Then, we can re-write the planner’s problem as:
max
c1,c2h,c2l,y1,y2h,K2
ln(c1) − y
2
1/2+l n ( c2h)/2+l n ( c2l)/2 − y
2
2h/4
s.t. c1 + K2 = rK1 + wy1
c2h/2+c2l/2=rK2 + wy2h/2
ln(c2h) − y
2
2h/2 ≥ ln(c2l)
c2h,c 2l,y 2h,K 2,y 1 ≥ 0
The solution to this problem must satisfy the following ﬁrst order conditions:
c
∗
1 + K
∗
2 = rK1 + wy
∗
1
c
∗
2h/2+c
∗
2l/2=rK
∗
2 + wy
∗
2h/2
ln(c
∗
2h) − y
2
2h/4=l n ( c
∗
2l)
1/c
∗
1 = r/[0.5c
∗
2h +0 .5c
∗
2l]
w/c
∗
2h = y
∗
2h
y
∗
1 = w/c
∗
1
2This argument is also similar to the one used by Chiappori, et al. (1994).
12The obvious way to implement this allocation is as follows. Suppose that there is
as i n g l eﬁrm that owns the technology. The ﬁrm rents capital and labor in each period to
produce output. In period 1, agents decide how much to work and how much capital to
accumulate, given a linear tax on capital income. In period 2, t h ea g e n t sd e c i d eh o wm u c ht o
work. If they generate zero income, they get a handout α2l (which may be negative). If they
earn positive income, they get a handout α2h. So, the proceeds from the linear tax on capital
income are being used to fund the subsidy to the disabled/unemployed agents in period 2.
More formally, deﬁne a tax mechanism in this world by (τk,α 2h,α 2l). Then, an equi-
librium in this economy is a speciﬁcation of (c1,c 2h,c 2l,y 1,y 2h,k 2) such that it solves:
max
c1,y1,c2h,c2l,y2h,k2
ln(c1) − y
2
1/2+l n ( c2h)/2+l n ( c2l)/2 − y
2
2h/4
s.t. c1 + k2 = rk1 + wy1
c2h = r(1 − τk)k2 + wy2h + α2h,y 2h > 0
c2h = r(1 − τk)k2 + α2l if y2h =0
c2l = r(1 − τk)k2 + α2l
k2,c 2h,c 2l,y 2h,y 1 ≥ 0
and markets clear:
c1 + k2 = rk1 + wy1
c2h/2+c2l/2=rk2 + wy2h/2
Note that in equilibrium, rτkk2 = α2h/2+α2l/2, which is the government’s budget constraint.
13Assume that the tax mechanism is such that the equilibrium value of y2h > 0. Then,
the ﬁrst order conditions to the agent’s problem are:
1/c1 = r(1 − τk)[0.5/c2h +0 .5/c2l]
y1 = w/c1
w/c2h = y2h
ln(c2h) − y
2
2h/2 ≥ ln(c2l)
c2h = r(1 − τk)k2 + wy2h + α2h
c2l = r(1 − τk)k2 + α2l
How do we pick the tax mechanism so as to make the solution to these ﬁrst order conditions
coincide with the equilibrium allocation? We set:
(1 − τk)=[ 0 .5c
∗
h +0 .5c
∗
l]
−1/[0.5/c
∗
2h +0 .5/c
∗
2l]
α2h = c
∗
2h − r(1 − τk)K
∗
2 − wy
∗
2h
α2l = c
∗
2l − r(1 − τk)K
∗
2
Then, the equilibrium ﬁrst order conditions line up exactly with the social optimality ﬁrst
order conditions. Note that the capital tax is positive.
But there’s a problem with this analysis. Under this tax mechanism, the optimal
allocation satisﬁes the agent’s ﬁrst order conditions. Nonetheless, the agent can do better
than choose the optimal allocation. Why is this? Note ﬁrst that:
1/c
∗
1 ≤ r(1 − τk)/c
∗
2l
14because
1/c
∗
1 = r(1 − τk)[0.5/c
∗
2h +0 .5/c
∗
2l]
c
∗
2h >c
∗
2l
Now suppose the agent saves k∗
2 + ε, and set y∗
2h =0 . His utility from this budget-
feasible plan is:
ln(c
∗
1 − ε)+l n ( c
∗
2l + r(1 − τk)ε)
as opposed to:
ln(c
∗
1)+l n ( c
∗
2h)/2 − y
∗2
2h/2+l n ( c
∗
2l)/2
=l n ( c
∗
1)+l n ( c
∗
2l)
Because 1/c∗
1 ≤ r(1 − τ∗
k)/c∗
2l, then the agent is better oﬀ from the new plan.
Intuitively, we have set the capital tax rate to guarantee that the agent does not
save too much or too little - assuming that he tells the truth about his type. The optimal
allocation pushes the agent to be indiﬀerent between telling the truth or lying. If he saves a
little bit more, and wealth eﬀects are nontrivial, then he will prefer to pretend to be disabled
when he is actually abled. Saving too much and shirking beats saving the right amount and
telling the truth about one’s type.
What this means is that the wedge does not immediately translate into a conclusion
about taxes. We have to ﬁnd a diﬀerent way to make a connection between the wedge and
tax rates.
15B. Fixing the Problem
The above problem came from the fact that even though the agent was happy with sav-
ing k∗
2 when he told the truth, he wanted to save a diﬀerent amount when he lied. How do we
ﬁx this problem? One way is to tailor the tax rates on saving to the agent’s announcements.
In particular, deﬁne a new tax mechanism (τkh,τkl,α 2h,α 2l). This mechanism works
like this. If the agent produces 0 eﬀective labor in period 2, then he receives a handout α2l
and his savings tax rate is τkl. If the agent produces a positive amount of eﬀective labor in
period 2, he receives a handout α2h and his savings tax rate is τkh. His problem becomes:
max
c1,y1,c2h,c2l,y2h,k2
ln(c1) − y
2
1/2+l n ( c2h)/2+l n ( c2l)/2 − y
2
2h/4
s.t. c1 + k2 = rk1 + wy1
c2h = r(1 − τkh)k2 + wy2h + α2h,y 2h > 0
c2h = r(1 − τkl)k2 + α2l if y2h =0
c2l = r(1 − τkl)k2 + α2l
k2,c 2h,c 2l,y 2h,y 1 ≥ 0
Deﬁne (τkl,τkh,α 2l,α 2h) so that:
(1 − τkl)r/c
∗
2l =1 /c
∗
1
(1 − τkh)r/c
∗
2h =1 /c
∗
1
α2i = c
∗
2i − r(1 − τ
∗
ki)k
∗
2,i= h,l
Then, I claim that under this tax mechanism, the equilibrium allocation coincides with the
16optimal allocation.
Why? Suppose that the agent works y2h > 0 in period 2 when abled. Then, his
solution for his other choice variables is:
1/c1 = r[0.5(1 − τkh)/c2h +0 .5(1 − τkl)/c2l]
w/c1 = y1
c1 + k2 = rk1 + wy1
c2h = r(1 − τkh)k2 + wy2h + α2h
c2l = r(1 − τkl)k2 + α2l
The starred allocation satisﬁes these ﬁrst order conditions.
What if the agent works y2h =0in period 2 when abled? Then, his ﬁrst order
conditions become:
1/c1 = r(1 − τkl)/c2l
w/c1 = y1
c1 + k2 = rk1 + wy1
c2h = r(1 − τkl)k2 + α2l
c2l = r(1 − τkl)k2 + α2l
Again, the starred allocations satisfy these ﬁrst order conditions. The agent is indiﬀerent
between working y∗
2h in period 2 (when abled) and not working in period 2.
Thus, we can implement the optimal allocation using a tax schedule that is linear in
17capital income and nonlinear in labor income. Note that τkl >τ kh; people who don’t work
get hit with a higher savings tax rate than those who work.
I want to emphasize that it is still optimal to have a wedge between the intertem-
poral marginal rate of substitution and the intertemporal marginal rate of transformation.
However, the only way to decentralize this wedge using linear taxes on savings is to use
state-contingent tax rates.
4. A General Implementation
I now use the above two-period analysis to build a general implementation of a solution
to the planner’s problem. I make one assumption: c∗ depends on (θ
T,zT) only through
(y∗(θ
T,zT),zT). This assumption allows me to implement the optimal allocation using a tax
schedule that is written in terms of eﬀective labor, not in terms of θ
t.
To this end, let (c∗,y∗,K∗) be an optimal allocation. Let:
DOM = {(y
T,z
T) ∈ R
T
+ × Z
T|y
T = y
∗(θ
T,z
T) for some θ
T in Θ
T}
I assume that there exists a function b c∗ : DOM → ΘT × ZT where b c∗
t is (yt,zt)-measurable
and:
b c
∗(y
∗(θ
T,z
T),z
T)=c
∗(θ
T,z
T)
for all (θ
T,zT). This assumption guarantees that an agent’s consumption depends on his
private information only through his history of eﬀective labor. It is an assumption about
endogenous variables, and I do not know how to map it into an assumption about the model’s
exogenous elements.
This assumption seems somewhat innocuous. After all, how could one get eﬀective
labor supply to vary across two diﬀerent types without oﬀering diﬀerent levels of consumption
18to them? Indeed, in a static setting, the assumption is a trivial consequence of incentive-
compatibility. But in a dynamic setting, it is possible to construct examples of environments
in which the assumption is not satisﬁed. I present one in Appendix B.3
A. Elements of the Implementation
Given the optimal allocation (c∗,y ∗,K∗), we know from Proposition 1 that there exists
λ
∗
t+1 : ZT → R+ such that λ
∗
t+1 is zt+1-measurable and:
λ
∗
t+1 = β[E(u
0(c
∗
t+1)
−1|θ
t,z
t+1)]
−1/u
0(c
∗
t)
Let MPK∗
t (zT)=FKt(K∗
t (zT),Y∗
t (zT),zT) and MPL∗
t(zT)=FYt(K∗
t (zT),Y∗
t (zT),zT) be
the marginal product of capital and labor respectively in the optimal allocation.
The key elements of the implementation will be a tax on wealth and a tax on labor
income. Deﬁne τ∗
t+1 : DOM → R+ to satisfy:
λ
∗
t+1(z
T)=βu
0(b c
∗
t+1(y
T,z
T))(1 − τ
∗
t+1(y
T,z
T))/u
0(b c
∗
t(y
T,z
T))
for all (yT,zT) in DOM. Verbally, τ∗
t+1 equates the ex-post individual marginal rate of substi-
tution with the ex-post societal marginal rate of transformation. Note that τ∗
t+1 is (yt+1,zt+1)
measurable. We will use τ∗ as a wealth tax.
Finally, let (ψ
∗, b k∗):DOM → R2T
+ ,w h e r eψ
∗
t and b k∗
t+1 are (yt,zt)-measurable and
satisfy:
b c
∗
t(y
T,z
T)+b k
∗
t+1(y
T,z
T)=( 1− τ
∗
t+1(y
T,z
T))(1 − δ + MPK
∗
t (z
T))b k
∗
t(y
T,z
T)
+MPL
∗
t(z
T)yt − ψ
∗
t(y
T,z
T)
3I used an insight of Ivan Werning’s to construct this example.
19Z
θT∈ΘT
b k
∗
t+1(y
∗(θ
T,z
T),z
T)dµΘ = K
∗
t (z
T)
b k
∗
1 = K
∗
1
for all t and for all (yT,zT). Here, the idea is that an agent who earns yt in period t and has
history yt−1 loses taxes to the government in period t as prescribed by ψ
∗. The process b k∗
describes how much of the capital stock is owned by an agent with labor income history yT,
when the public history is zT.
B. A Sequential Markets Economy and Its Equilibrium
We use these deﬁnitions to construct a sequential markets economy with nonlinear
taxes in which there exists an equilibrium that implements the optimum. In the economy,
there is a single representative ﬁrm that owns the technology of production, and rents capital
and hires eﬀe c t i v el a b o ri ne a c hp e r i o d . T h eﬁrm takes period t capital rents rt and period
t wages wt as given.
The agents in the economy all begin life with K∗
1 units of capital. They trade capital,
labor, and consumption in a sequence of competitive markets. The agents pay wealth taxes
τ∗ on their undepreciated physical capital holdings; they also pay labor income taxes ψ
∗ on
their labor income wtyt. They can split their after-tax wealth among consumption and capital
for next period.
Formally, the typical agent takes as given a tax system (ψ
∗,φ
∗,DOM) and prices
(r,w). He then has a choice problem of the form:
max
c,y,k
T X
t=1
β
t−1
Z
zT∈ZT
Z
θT∈ΘT{u(ct(θ
T,z
T)) − v(yt(θ
T,z
T)/φt(θ
T,z
T))}dµΘdµZ
20s.t.ct(θ
T,z
T)+kt+1(θ
T,z
T)=( 1− τ
∗
t(y(θ
T,z
T),z
T))(1 − δ + rt(z
T))kt(θ
T,z
T)
+wt(z
T)yt(θ
T,z
T) − ψ
∗
t(y(θ
T,z
T),z
T) for all (θ
T,z
T)
(ct,k t+1,y t) is (θ
t,z
t)-measurable and non-negative
(y(θ
T,z
T),z
T) is in DOM for all (θ
T,z
T)
k1 ≤ K
∗
1
An equilibrium in this economy is a speciﬁcation of (c,y,k) and (r,w) such that (c,y,k)
solves the agent’s problem, given ψ,τ∗,r,and w, such that rt(zT)=Fkt(Kt(zT),Y t(zT),zT)
and wt(zT)=FYt(Kt(zT),Y t(zT),zT), and such that markets clear for all t and zT:
Z
θT∈ΘT ct(θ
T,z
T)dµΘ + Gt(z
T)+Kt+1(z
T)
= Ft(Kt(z
T),Y t(z
T),z
T)+( 1− δ)Kt(z
T)
Kt(z
T)=
Z
θT∈ΘT kt(θ
T,z
T)dµΘ
Yt(z
T)=
Z
θT∈ΘT yt(θ
T,z
T)dµΘ
Note that in this deﬁnition of equilibrium, the government’s budget is balanced in every
period:
Gt(z
t)=
Z
θT∈ΘT τ
∗
t(y(θ
T,z
T),z
T){(1 − δ + rt(z
T))kt(θ
T,z
T)}dµΘ
+
Z
θT∈ΘT ψ
∗(y(θ
T,z
T),z
T)dµΘ
21C. A Second Welfare Theorem
I now claim that the optimal allocation is an equilibrium allocation. As usual, we
use social shadow values to construct equilibrium prices; let r∗
t = MPK∗
t and let w∗
t =
MPL∗
t. Clearly, given these prices, the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions are satisﬁed. The optimal
allocation satisﬁes market-clearing. Hence, we need only verify that given prices (r∗,w ∗), and
at a xs y s t e m(ψ
∗,φ
∗,D), the allocation (c∗,y∗,K∗) is optimal for an agent in the economy.
To prove this claim, we need the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Given prices (r∗,w ∗) and a tax system (ψ
∗,φ
∗,D), and given that the typ-
ical agent chooses y0, his optimal choices of (c,k) are c0
t(θ
T,zT)=b c∗
t(y0(θ
T,zT),zT) and
k0
t(θ
T,zT)=b k∗
t(y0(θ
T,zT),zT).
Proof. Deﬁne τ0 : ΘT × ZT → R by τ0(θ
T,zT)=τ∗(y0(θ
T,zT),zT) and ψ
0(θ
T,zT)=
ψ
∗(y0(θ
T,zT),zT). Then, given that the agent chooses eﬀective labor strategy y0, his intertem-
poral consumption problem becomes:
max
c,K
T X
t=1
β
t−1
Z
θT∈ΘT
Z
zT∈ZT u(ct)dµΘdµZ
s.t.ct + kt+1 =( 1− τ
∗
t)(1 − δ + rt)kt + wty
0
t − ψ
0
t
ct,k t+1 are (θ
t,z
t)-measurable and non-negative
k1 ≤ K
∗
1
The ﬁrst order conditions to this problem are:
βE{(1 − τ
0
t+1)u
0(ct+1)(1 − δ + rt+1)|θ
t,z
t} = u
0(ct)
22ct + kt+1 =( 1− τ
0
t)(1 − δ + rt)kt + wty
0
t − ψ
0
t
The ﬁrst order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient (once y0 is ﬁxed).
My claim is that (c0,k 0) satisfy these ﬁrst order conditions. Clearly, from the deﬁnition
of ψ
∗ and b k∗, they satisfy the ﬂow budget constraints. What about the Euler equations? We
know that for all (yT,zT) in D:
(1 − τ
∗
t+1(y
T,z
T))λ
∗
t+1(z
T)
−1 = β
−1u
0(b c
∗
t(y
T,z
T))/u
0(b c
∗
t+1(y
T,z
T))
and so for all (θ
T,zT):
(1 − τ
0
t+1(θ
T,z
T))λ
∗
t+1(z
T)
−1
=( 1 − τ
∗
t(y
0(θ
T,z
T),z
T))λ
∗
t+1(z
T)
−1
= β
−1u
0(b c
∗
t(y
0(θ
T,z
T),z
T))/u
0(b c
∗
t+1(y
0(θ
T,z
T),z
T))
= β
−1u
0(c
0
t(θ
T,z
T))/u
0(c
0
t+1(θ
T,z
T))
Hence:
βE{(1 − τ
0
t+1)u
0(c
0
t+1)(1 − δ + rt+1)|θ
t,z
t} − u
0(c
0
t)
=[ E{λt+1(1 − δ + rt+1)|θ
t,z
t} − 1]u
0(c
0
t)
=0
This proves the proposition. QED
Proposition 2 considers an agent who chooses an arbitrary eﬀective labor strategy y0
where (y0(θ
T,zT),zT) ∈ D for all (θ
T,zT). Because (y0(θ
T,zT),zT) ∈ D for all (θ
T,zT), there
23exists a reporting strategy σ0 : ΘT × ZT → ΘT × ZT that satisﬁes:
y
∗(σ
0(θ
T,z
T)) = y
0(θ
T,z
T) for all (θ
T,z
T)
The content of Proposition 2 is that if an agent chooses y0, it is optimal for him to choose an
asset allocation plan that gives him consumption c0(θ
T,zT), where for all (θ
T,zT):
c
0(θ
T,z
T)
= b c
∗(y
0(θ
T,z
T),z
T)
= b c
∗(y
∗(σ
0(θ
T,z
T)),z
T)
= c
∗(σ
0(θ
T,z
T))
We can now use Proposition 2 to show that given prices and taxes, a consumer’s
optimal choice from his budget set is (c∗,y∗,k ∗), where k∗(θ
T,zT)=b k∗(y∗(θ
T,zT),zT). To
complete the argument, we need only show that the optimal eﬀective labor strategy is y∗.
We know from Proposition 2 that an agent who chooses y0, and then chooses an optimal
consumption-savings strategy, receives utility W(σ0;c∗,y∗), where σ0 is deﬁned as above. But
this utility is no larger than W(σTT;c∗,y ∗), which can be achieved by choosing y∗ and then
saving optimally. The agent is weakly better oﬀ choosing y∗.
Thus, we have successfully implemented the optimal allocation as an equilibrium al-
location using the tax mechanism (ψ
∗,τ∗,D). In the implementation, agents can only trade
capital and consumption. However, it is straightforward to extend the analysis to allow agents
to trade zt+1-contingent claims that are available in zero net supply. Indeed, the structure of
the optimal taxes τ∗ is left unaltered by adding these ﬁnancial asset markets.
245. Implications for Optimal Taxes
It is easy to prove that in the above implementation, the expected wealth tax rate in
period (t +1 ) , conditional on (θ
t,zt+1),i sz e r o . D e ﬁne:
τ
∗∗
t+1(θ
T,z
T)=τ
∗
t+1(y
∗(θ
T,z
T),z
T) for all (θ
T,z
T)
By construction:
(1 − τ
∗∗
t+1)=β
−1λ
∗
t+1u
0(c
∗
t+1)
−1u
0(c
∗
t)
so that the after-tax ex-post marginal rate of substitution is set equal to the social discount
factor.
Then:
E{(1 − τ
∗∗
t+1(θ
T,z
T))|θ
t,z
t+1}
= E{β
−1λ
∗
t+1u
0(c
∗
t+1)
−1u
0(c
∗
t)|θ
t,z
t+1}
= β
−1λ
∗
t+1u
0(c
∗
t)E{u
0(c
∗
t+1)
−1|θ
t,z
t+1} by (θ
t,z
t+1)-measurability of λ
∗
t+1u
0(c
∗
t)
=1
where the last step follows from Proposition 1. Thus, the expected wealth tax rate is zero.
Who pays the higher tax? This is also easy to see. Conditional on (θ
t,zt+1), the
variance in the wealth tax rate derives from the dependence of u0(c∗
t+1)−1 on θt+1. The after-
tax rate (1−τ∗∗
t+1) is surprisingly high for agents with a surprisingly high 1/u0(c∗
t+1) -t h a ti s ,
ah i g hc∗
t+1. Intuitively, the high wealth tax rate on the unskilled is needed to deter agents
from doing a joint deviation of saving too much and then working too little when skilled in
the following period.
25This result implies immediately that any given individual’s expected wealth tax rate
is zero. However, there is a second, slightly more subtle, implication: under any optimal
system, wealth taxes are purely redistributional because the government raises no net revenue
from them in any public history zt+1. This result may seem surprising at ﬁrst because many
individual capital-holdings processes k∗ are consistent with optimality. Nonetheless, suppose
k∗ is an equilibrium process of capital-holdings given that wealth taxes as a function of
(θ
T,zT) equal τ∗∗. Then, we can calculate the total revenue from wealth taxes in each public
history:
Z
θT∈ΘT τ
∗∗
t+1(θ
T,z
T)k
∗
t+1(θ
T,z
T)(1 − δ + MPK
∗
t+1(z
T))dµΘ
=( 1 − δ + MPK
∗
t+1(z
T))E(τ
∗∗
t+1k
∗
t+1|z
t+1)
=( 1 − δ + MPK
∗
t+1(z
T))E(E(τ
∗∗
t+1|θ
t,z
t+1)k
∗
t+1|z
t+1)
=0
The key step in this calculation is the penultimate one, in which I exploit the Law of Iterated
Expectations and the fact that k∗
t+1 is (θ
t,zt)-measurable.
It is important to note that the labor income taxes ψ
∗ are indeterminate. There is a
large set of labor income tax schedules and individual capital-holdings (ψ
∗, b k∗) that can be
used as part of a tax mechanism that supports a given optimal allocation (c∗,y ∗,K∗).L o o s e l y
speaking, these various optimal tax systems diﬀer in terms of the timing of tax collections.
For example, suppose T =2 , but people only earn labor income in period 1 (which
implies in turn that optimal capital taxes are zero for everyone). Suppose one optimal tax
system is to tax agents with high income $10000 in period 1, and not tax agents with low
26income. Then, we can construct another optimal tax system by taxing high-income agents
$1000 in period 1, and $9000(1 + r) in period 2, while transferring $9000 in period 1 to low-
income agents and then taxing them $9000(1+r) in period 2. This tax system is also optimal,
because the present value of the tax burden for each possible report is kept the same. But
individual-capital holdings in equilibrium change (high-income agents hold less capital under
the second system, while low-income agents hold more).
In the above class of optimal mechanisms, the government’s budget is balanced in
every period. However, using the reasoning in the above paragraph, it is possible to construct
optimal tax structures with alternative streams of government debt: there is simply no notion
of an optimal debt structure in this world. This is a consequence of the richness of the tax
structure: as Bassetto and Kocherlakota (2004) emphasize, when taxes can depend on past
incomes, debt is irrelevant.
The tax system is linear in wealth. But it is not arbitrage-free. Consider an agent who
faces no future skill risk; in the optimal tax system, he faces no wealth taxes. Other agents
face wealth tax risk that is correlated with their equilibrium consumptions. They would like
to shield their wealth from taxes by making an oﬀ-book loan to the "no-risk" agent that
allows him to do all of the capital accumulation in the economy.4
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I describe a general implementation for the Pareto optima in a dynamic
Mirrlees economy. The implementation relies on a tax system that is nonlinear in labor
4Like I do, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2003b) consider an optimal tax problem in a dynamic Mirrlees economy.
However, they assume that the government is restricted to using arbitrage-free taxes on wealth. The optimal
tax is typically non-zero in their setting. Its sign depends on details of the data generation process for skills.
27income and linear in wealth. As in GKT (2003), it is Pareto optimal to have social shadow
rates of return be higher than individual shadow rates of return. However, it is not possible
to implement the optimum by equating this wedge with a tax on wealth. Instead, the tax
on wealth accumulated from period t to period (t +1 )must be designed to equate the ex-
post individual after-tax rate of return with the social shadow rate of return. The resulting
average wealth tax rate is zero, and the government never collects any net tax revenue from
wealth taxes.
In this paper, the government is treated as the sole provider of insurance against skill
shocks. It is clear that the results about wealth taxation are sensitive to this assumption.
Suppose instead that agents are ex-ante identical and can sign long-term contracts with
insurance entities (as for example in Atkeson and Lucas (1992)). Then, the social insurance
can be handled by the private sector. There is still a need for taxation - to fund government
expenditures - but these taxes optimally take the form of lump-sum levies. There is no need
for either labor income taxes or capital income taxes.5
Nonetheless, it remains true that much social insurance in highly developed economies
is done by the government. I view the analysis in this paper as taking this fact as given
and then providing a partial characterization of the nature of optimal dynamic taxation.
Understanding why the government plays such a large role in social insurance - using eﬃciency
or other considerations - is an important goal for future research.
5Golosov and Tsyvinski (2003b) provide a formal justiﬁcation of this basic intuition.
287. Appendix A
In this appendix, I prove Proposition 1. The proof has two parts. In the ﬁrst part,
I establish that (c∗,y ∗,K∗) solves a particular resource minimization problem. In the second
part, I derive the ﬁrst-order conditions to that minimization problem.
A. Part 1
Note ﬁrst that we can use Lemma 1 of GKT (2003) to show that any optimal allocation
satisﬁes all feasibility constraints with equality.
Next, deﬁne µ(zt+1|zt) to be the conditional probability of zt+1, given zt. Consider the
following minimization problem MIN.(I abuse notation slightly by writing c∗
t(θ
T,zt) to refer
to c∗
t(θ
T,zt,z t+1,z t+2,...,zT).)
min
ct,ct+1,Kt+1,ζ
Z
θT∈ΘT ct(θ
T)dµΘ + Kt+1
s.t. u(ct(θ
T)) = u(c
∗
t(θ
T,z
t)) + β
X
zt+1∈Z
ζ(θ
T,z t+1)µ(zt+1|z
t) for almost all θ
T in Θ
T
u(ct+1(θ
T,z t+1)) = u(c
∗
t+1(θ
T,z
t,z t+1)) − ζ(θ
T,z t+1) for all zt+1 in Z
and almost all θ
T in Θ
T
Z
θT∈ΘT ct+1(θ
T)dµΘ − Ft+1(Kt+1,Y
∗
t+1(z
T),z
T) − (1 − δ)Kt+1 = −K
∗
t+2(z
T) − Gt+1(z
T)
ct : Θ
T → R+,c t θ
t-measurable
ct+1 : Θ
T × Z → R+,c t+1 θ
t+1-measurable
ζ : Θ
T × Z → R, ζ θ
t-measurable
Kt+1 ∈ R+
This minimization problem constructs a class of perturbations around the optimum (c∗,y∗,K∗).
29The perturbations lower utility in period (t +1 )by a (θ
t,z t+1)-contingent amount ζ. This
increase is corrected by lowering utility in period t by the expected value of ζ.
I claim that if (c∗,y ∗,K∗) is optimal, a solution to MIN is:
ct(θ
T)=c
∗
t(θ
T,z
t) a.e.
ct+1(θ
T,z t+1)=c
∗
t+1(θ
T,z
t,z t+1) a.e.
Kt+1 = K
∗
t+1(z
t)
ζ(θ
T,z t+1)=0a.e.
Suppose instead that the solution to MIN is (c0
t,c 0
t+1,K0
t+1,ζ
0). Let B be the Borel subset of
ΘT with measure 1 on which the constraints in MIN are valid. Deﬁne (c∗∗,K∗∗) by:
c
∗∗
t (θ
T,z
t,z t+1,..,zT)=c
0
t(θ
T) for all θ
T in B and all (zt+s)
T−t
s=1 in Z
T−t
c
∗∗
t+1(θ
T,z
t,z t+1,z t+2..,zT)=c
0
t+1(θ
T,z t+1) for all θ
T in B and all (zt+s)
T−t
s=1 in Z
T−t
c
∗∗
t (θ
T,z
T)=c
∗
t(θ
T,z
T) for all other t,θ
T,z
T.
K
∗∗
t (z
t,z t+1,z t+2,...,zT)=K
0
t+1 for all (zt+s)
T−t
s=1 in Z
T−t
K
∗∗
t (z
T)=K
∗
t (z
T) for all other z
T
Obviously, the planner’s objective is the same when evaluated at (c∗∗,y∗,K∗∗) as at (c∗,y ∗,K∗).
Also, (c∗∗,y ∗,K∗∗) does not satisfy the period t resource constraint in history zt with equality
(because it uses fewer resources than (c∗,y ∗,K∗)).
The crux of the proof is to show that (c∗∗,y∗) is incentive-compatible. Let σ be an
30arbitrary reporting strategy. Then:
W(σ;c
∗∗,y
∗) − W(σ;c
∗,y
∗)
=
Z
ZT
Z
ΘT
T X
t=1
β
t−1{u(c
∗∗
t (σ)) − u(c
∗
t(σ))}
= µ(z
t){β
t
Z
B
X
zt+1∈Z
µ(zt+1|z
t)βζ
0(σ
t
θ(θ
T,z
t),z t+1))dµΘ
−β
t+1
Z
B
X
zt+1∈Z
µ(zt+1|z
t)ζ
0(σ
t
θ(θ
T,z
t),z t+1))dµΘ}
=0
where σt(θ
T,zt) ≡ (σ1(θ
T,zt,z t+1,z t+2,...,zT),...σt(θ
T,zt,z t+1,...,zT)) for arbitrary (zt+1,...,zT).
It follows that:
W(σ;c
∗∗,y
∗) − W(σTT;c
∗∗,y
∗)
= W(σ;c
∗,y
∗) − W(σTT;c
∗,y
∗)
≤ 0
Thus, if (c∗,y ∗) is incentive-compatible, so is (c∗∗,y ∗). This completes the ﬁrst part of the
proof.
B. Part 2
In this part of the proof, I derive ﬁrst order necessary conditions to MIN. The basic
approach is like GKT (2003). The constraint set of MIN is a subset of essentially bounded
random variables over ΘT × Z. Let L∞
t be the set of essentially bounded random variables
31over ΘT that are θ
t-measurable. The necessary conditions for MIN then are:
X
zt+1∈Z
((1 − δ) − FK(K
∗
t+1,Y
∗
t+1))γ
∗
t+1(zt+1)=1
Z
ηtdµΘ − hm
∗
1,u
0(c
∗
t)ηti =0for all ηt in L
∞
t
γ
∗
t+1(zt+1)
Z
εt+1dµΘ − hm
∗
2(zt+1),u
0(c
∗
t+1(.,zt+1))εt+1i =0
for all εt+1 in L
∞
t+1 and all zt+1 in Z
0=hβm
∗
1µ(zt+1|z
t),νti − hm
∗
2(zt+1),νti
for all νt in L
∞
t and all zt+1 in Z
Here, m∗
1 is an element of the dual of L∞
t and is the Lagrange multiplier on the ﬁrst constraint
of MIN; for each value of zt+1,m ∗
2(zt+1) is an element of the dual of L∞
t (NOT L∞
t+1) and is
the Lagrange multiplier on the second constraint of MIN. Finally, γ∗
t+1(zt+1) is a multiplier
on the last constraint in MIN for each value of zt+1.
We can rewrite the second ﬁrst order condition and combine the latter two to get:
Z
η
0
t/u
0(c
∗
t)dµΘ − hm
∗
1,η
0
ti =0for all η
0
t in L
∞
t
γ
∗
t+1(zt+1)
Z
v
0
t/u
0(c
∗
t+1(.,zt+1))dµΘ = hβm
∗
1µ(zt+1|z
t),ν
0
ti
for all ν
0
t in L
∞
t and all zt+1 in Z
Together, these imply that:
βµ(zt+1|z
t)
Z
η
0
t/u
0(c
∗
t)dµΘ = γ
∗
t+1(zt+1)
Z
η
0
t/u
0(c
∗
t+1(.,zt+1))dµΘ for all η
0
t in L
∞
t
32By plugging in η0
t =1 A,w h e r eA is an arbitrary Borel set in Θt, and using the standard
deﬁnition of a conditional expectation, we get:
βµ(zt+1|z
t)/u
0(c
∗
t)=γ
∗
t+1(zt+1)E(1/u
0(c
∗
t+1(.,zt+1)|θ
t)
Deﬁne:
λ
∗
t+1(z
t,z t+1)=γ
∗
t+1(zt+1)/µ(zt+1|z
t)
Then:
λ
∗
t+1(z
t,z t+1)=β{E(u
0(c
∗
t+1)
−1|θ
t,z
t+1)}
−1/u
0(c
∗
t)
and:
1=E{λ
∗
t+1(1 − δ + FK,t+1)|z
t}
This proves the proposition.
338. Appendix B
In this appendix, I construct an example environment in which the optimal consump-
tion c∗ does not depend on θ solely through y∗.
Let T =2and Θ = {1,2,3}. Assume that:
φ1(1,θ2)=5 + h and φ2(1,θ2)=5for all θ2
φ1(2,θ2)=5 and φ2(2,θ 2)=5for all θ2
φ1(3,θ2)=5 and φ2(3,θ 2)=4 .5 for all θ2
Hence, agents know their skill sequences in period 1 itself. There are three types of agents.
Type 1 agents have high skills in period 1 and medium skills in period 2. Type 2 agents have
medium skills in both period. Finally, type 3 agents have medium skills in period 1 and low
skills in period 2. Later, I describe how the parameter h is chosen.
I assume that u(c)=c1/2, v(l)=l2, and β =1 . Also, I assume that the depreciation
rate δ =1and F(K,Y )=K +Y. All agents are initially endowed with zero units of capital.
I solved numerically for the optimal allocation of consumption and eﬀective labor. I
ﬁnd that if I choose h =0 .30087, Ig e t :
c1(1,.)=c2(1,.)=8 .900
c1(2,.)=c2(2,.)=8 .532
c1(3,.)=c2(3,.)=8 .497
y1(1,.)=9 .419;y2(1,.)=8 .380
y1(2,.)=y2(2,.)=8 .559
34y1(3,.)=9 .419;y2(3,.)=7 .523
Ic h o s eh so that in the eﬃcient allocation, y1(1,.)=y1(3,.). Hence, we have an
example in which consumption in period 1 is diﬀerent for types 1 and 3, but eﬀective labor is
the same. There is no way to implement this outcome using a tax system that depends only
on eﬀective labor.
This example is non-generic - by perturbing h away from 0.30087, we get an allocation
in which consumption is a function of eﬀe c t i v el a b o r . B u tIs u s p e c tt h a ti ti sp o s s i b l et o
construct similar examples in which Θ is an interval that are more robust to perturbing the
parameters of the economy.
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